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数学学院、所2024年系列学术活动(第148场):王珺 教授 长春工业大学

发表于: 2024-12-10   点击: 

报告题目:Research on low-carbon closed-loop supply chain strategy based on differential games——dynamic optimization analysis of new and remanufactured products

报 告 人:王珺 教授

所在单位:长春工业大学

报告时间:2024年12月10日 星期二 15:00-15:45

报告地点:吉林大学中心校区数学楼第二报告厅

校内联系人:程建华 chengjh@jlu.edu.cn


报告摘要:With the current increasing global demand for low-carbon and environmentally friendly products, promoting the sustainability of closed-loop supply chains has become one of the key measures. However, consumers often do not regard remanufactured products as equivalent to new products. Therefore, this paper proposes a dynamic closed-loop supply chain that incorporates consumers’ purchasing preferences to model a long-term game with product differentiation. Moreover, to enhance consumer acceptance of remanufactured products and reduce manufacturers’ costs, low-carbon technologies and cost-sharing mechanisms are introduced. In this way, we construct a differential game in which the manufacturer sells new and remanufactured products through a retailer and makes decisions about the level of low-carbon technology in the remanufacturing process. Based on the theory of differential games, this paper analyzes three different power structures: the manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg game, the Nash game, and the retailer-dominated Stackelberg game. The optimal low-carbon technology level and pricing strategy are obtained by applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle. The study shows that the retailer-led Stackelberg game helps retailers maximize profits, while the Nash game enables the entire closed-loop supply chain system to achieve the highest overall profits. This paper innovatively integrates low-carbon technologies into the dynamic game model of the remanufacturing process and reveals how the game behavior of supply chain participants affects the application of low-carbon technologies and the overall profit of the supply chain by comparing the cost-sharing mechanisms under different power structures. The results provide important theoretical support and practical references for closed-loop supply chain management with product differentiation.


报告人简介:王珺,教授,博士生导师。现任吉林省工业与应用数学学会常务理事,吉林省运筹学学会常务理事。目前主要从事博弈论,动力系统统计推断等研究。主持国家自然科学基金项目1项、国家数学天元基金1项、吉林省科技厅自然科学基金2项、吉林省教育厅1项,主参12项国家及省级课题。在国内外知名学术期刊发表二十余篇高水平学术论文,其中SCI、SSCI双检索3篇。